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 An overwhelming number of shipments of goods are imported into the country every day. With 
each shipment comes the risk that an invasive species is entering the country, either intentionally 
or unintentionally. Policies aimed at excluding these invasive species or pests from entering the 
country include pre-shipment treatment requirements, varied inspection schemes, treatment at the 
border, penalties, and import bans or restrictions. These pest exclusion policies, viewed by some 
as veiled barriers to trade, have been developed primarily based on scientific risk assessment 
without economic analysis of the response of importers to border enforcement policies. Existing 
policies are based on the reasoning that increased enforcement effort will result in higher 
detection levels, or more specifically, that increased inspection will result in a higher number of 
interceptions and, in turn, higher compliance.  
Instead of responding to increased enforcement with increased due care with respect to 
pest control, importers may respond in ways that regulators do not intend, expending effort to 
avoid enforcement. For example, importers may not export goods, may ship a reduced amount, 
or may switch ports of entry. Different types of firms are likely to avoid enforcement in different 
ways. High-risk firms, in particular, may engage in “port shopping,” routing shipments through 
ports where enforcement is perceived to be weakest, or timing their shipments to arrive at a port 
when inspection staffs are low. Low-risk firms, with little to hide but wanting to avoid costly 
inspections nonetheless, may choose low-enforcement ports to a lesser degree. These decisions 
concerning port choice may have significant supply and pest risk effects as well as spatial 
damage or vulnerability effects. 
Limited theoretical and empirical work exists in the enforcement and deterrence literature 
that evaluates the role of firm response in an environmental context. Inspections are a 
complicated enforcement tool, examined in a limited way in the economics of invasive species 
  2literature. Port shopping is a type of avoidance behavior, not discussed in the enforcement 
literature nor in the economics of invasive species literature.  
This paper presents a theoretical model of firm response to border enforcement. The 
model considers two inspection and enforcement schemes for imports of a single commodity 
(destroy versus treat contaminated goods) and reveals both the intended and unintended effects 
of this enforcement. We analyze optimal firm response to changes in enforcement, economic and 
biological parameters (i.e., pest populations), how regulator behavior (i.e., inspection, penalties) 
affects social welfare, and the nature of the tradeoffs associated with location.  
In response to an increase in inspection, we find that firms will reduce the amount they 
ship for export, an unintended response, and may increase or decrease pre-entry treatment 
depending on the elasticity of the marginal cost of treatment with respect to output. Firms 
consider the tradeoffs associated with changes in tariffs, penalties, and output price, as well as 
with the costs and benefits associated with location – i.e., inspection intensity versus distance to 
port-of-entry and final market. Different types of firms will weigh these tradeoffs differently. 
The present analysis implies that high-risk firms are likely to select ports that are perceived to be 
low-enforcement ports, rather than pre-entry treatment, and perhaps forfeiting travel distance. 
Low-risk firms are likely to value transportation cost savings versus avoiding enforcement. Thus, 
increased enforcement may not result in reduced pest risk. Although an increase in enforcement 
or port-specific costs at a particular port has the obvious result that firms are more likely switch 
away from that port, even a uniform change in enforcement may lead to changes in port choices.  
Further implications of the model are that Scenario 1 (destroy) is likely to be optimal to Scenario 
2 when response costs and potential damages are high, and consumer surplus impacts are low, 
and that optimal inspection and penalties increase, as does the optimality of Scenario 1 (destroy), 
as ex post damages increase and effectiveness of ex post treatment decreases. Thus, the intensity 
  3and effectiveness of border inspections affects the decisions of the firm and in turn, the optimal 
levels of ex post monitoring and response effort. 
 
Literature Review 
The basis of economics of enforcement research is the concept that achieving optimal 
enforcement is simply a matter of balancing the level of fines and probability of detection 
(Becker 1968) while minimizing government monitoring costs. This body of research generally 
assumes that the effectiveness of enforcement is entirely determined by the regulator (i.e., 
exogenous to the firm) and that firms are limited to choosing the level of a single action such as 
pollution or output levels. Malik (1990) suggested that detection probabilities are actually 
endogenous to firms, that firm response in the form of “avoidance” activities can reduce the 
probability of detection and thus the effectiveness of enforcement measures. In contrast to 
Becker’s conclusion that fines should be set arbitrarily high, Malik showed that optimal fines 
may actually be lower because of avoidance by firms.
1 Even if firms are assumed to be risk-
neutral, higher fines may induce firms to exert effort to lower the probability of being fined.  
In the environmental enforcement literature, several authors have found that stricter 
environmental regulations, in the form of higher emissions penalties or stricter standards, 
produce not only a desired direct effect but also an indirect effect of increasing incentives for 
regulated parties to reduce the probability of detection (Lee 1984; Kambhu 1990; Oh 1995; 
Huang 1996; Kadambe and Segerson 1998). Lee concluded that in response to higher emission 
taxes, firms may find it profitable to invest in efforts to evade a pollution tax rather than reduce 
                                                 
1 Polinsky and Shavell (1979) argued that optimal fines are relatively lower (not arbitrarily high) 
if agents are assumed to be risk averse. Further, Polinsky and Shavell (1992) showed results 
similar to Malik (1990) concerning firm avoidance behavior. 
  4emissions, so optimal levels of pollution will not be achieved. Similarly, Oh and Huang found 
that raising pollution fees may actually increase pollution levels. Although this literature 
provides a foundation for our analysis, we could not find any publications in the general 
economics literature nor the environmental enforcement literature that considered how changes 
in monitoring effort on the part of regulators (instead of monetary incentives) may result in 
unintended firm response. While Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) and Thursby, Jensen, and 
Thursby (1991) provided an analysis of market structure under smuggling, firm response to 
enforcement measures was not explicitly evaluated.  
The environmental enforcement literature that examines monitoring as an enforcement 
tool again provides a foundation for our research. These analyses generally couple monitoring 
with either emission taxes (when pollution is observable) or output taxes (when pollution is 
unobservable). A recent example of this research using mechanism design with moral hazard is 
Demougin and Fluet (2001). Specific to invasive species, McAusland and Costello (2004) 
analyzed the optimal mix of tariffs (essentially an output tax) and inspections to control invasive 
species introductions. This analysis, however, did not evaluate the tradeoff between inspections 
and sanctions or fines nor did it consider potential avoidance behavior in response to 
enforcement.  
In the economics of invasive species literature, research on prevention and control does 
not address the specifics of border enforcement (Kim et al. 2006; Horan et al. 2002; Olson and 
Roy 2005). The tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of inspection policies in an invasive 
species context were considered by Batabyal (2004a; 2004b) and Moffit et al. (2005). While 
Batabyal provided details on how maritime inspections are carried out and accounted for 
economic losses due to delay, this work primarily presented a queuing theory approach and 
included a very simple implicit assumption that less stringent inspections lead to more damages 
  5from biological invasions. Moffit et al. (2005) focused on dealing with the limited knowledge 
that policy makers have concerning risks and policies that involve achieving threshold levels of 
risk.  
McAusland and Costello (2004) analyzed the optimal mix of tariffs (not penalties/fines) 
and inspection to control invasive species introductions. Using a two-country trade model, they 
found that although at low rates of infection, inspection increases as the proportion of infected 
goods increases, this relationship is reversed at higher rates and there should be no inspections 
past a certain threshold. This non-monotonicity stems from the assumption that infected good are 
barred from importation. Thus, as more infected shipment are detected, consumers in the 
importing country suffer. The analysis also found that as marginal damages from infected 
imports increases, monitoring unambiguously increases, while the optimal tariff decreases, again 
due to the cost of refusing infected goods. Often, however, infected goods are treated and then 
allowed entry. This analysis did not evaluate the tradeoff between inspections and sanctions or 
fines nor did it consider potential avoidance behavior in response to enforcement. 
Research on border control measures and invasive species, such as that by McAusland 
and Costello, has not considered heterogeneity of ports nor how this heterogeneity is linked 
spatially to damages. While spatial and dynamic analyses of damages from invasive species and 
pests are becoming more common (Barbier and Shogren 2004) these analyses generally do not 
consider border measures. Spatial damage analyses of invasive species and pests, however, 
especially those focusing on specific species and landscapes (e.g., Brown, Lynch, and Zilberman 
(2002) focused on Pierce’s disease in grapes) would inform development of a simulation model 
that integrates border enforcement and spatial pest damages. 
 
The Model 
  6The basis of our theoretical analysis builds on previous work by Ameden et al. (under review), 
and is a model of importing firm and government inspection agency behavior. Assume there are 
importing firms that handle a specific agricultural product and assume that pest risk 
increases with i. These firms ship their product through ports of entry, 
1,..., i = I
K 1,..., k = . The model 
has three stages (see Figure 1): 
•  Stage 1: Pre-border firm decisions- production, treatment and shipment to border, 
•  Stage 2: At the border regulator decisions- border inspections and enforcement, and 
•  Stage 3: Post-border firm and regulator decisions- shipment to final market, 
environmental damage, monitoring and control. 
Stage 1: Pre-border 
In Stage 1, we assume each firm is making post-harvest decisions. Each firm’s output has an 
associated initial pest population,  , known to the firm. Each firm chooses:  (0) i n
•  to which port to ship 
•  how many units to ship through the port to the importing country,  , and  ik y
•  point-of-origin treatment effort per unit, .   ik e
After the firm applies point-of-origin treatment, the pest population per unit is:  
(1) (0) ( ) ik i ik nn g e =  









∂ < ∂ . After point-of-origin treatment, the output is shipped to the chosen port of entry. 
Transportation cost from the point of origin for firm   to the port is  i ik τ . Initial cost of production 
is  . Total initial costs are  ( , ) ii ki k cye ( , ) ii ki k i k cye τ + . 
  7Stage 2: At the border 
Government inspection at the port will lead to discovery of  contaminated units of 
output where  is a fraction between 0 to 1 and is the port-specific value of 
inspection effort per unit of output, i.e.,  is a measure of inspection intensity.  Total inspection 
costs for the regulator are 
( (1), ) ik k ik hn w y
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These assumptions suggest that higher investment leads to higher discovery but the marginal 
productivity of investment is decreasing. This discovery function is a stylized representation of 
the actual discovery process which usually involves inspection of a limited portion of the 
shipment and declaration that an entire shipment is either cleared for entry or not based on this 
limited inspection. In our stylized model, the units of output could be interpreted as a stream of 
identical shipments and thus the discovery function indicates how many of these shipments are 
identified as contaminated. We compare two alternative scenarios when pests are discovered on 
shipments. 
Scenario 1. Shipments are destroyed 
In this case, units that are discovered to be contaminated are destroyed, actual quantity 
supplied by the ith firm is  , and the firm will pay a penalty of 
where  is the penalty per unit of contaminated output under 
Scenario 1. The total penalties collected from all firms are:  . 
1 (1 ( (1), )) ik ik k ik sh n w =−










Firms are charged a tariff,  j ,on only those shipments allowed entry,  (1 ( (1), )) ik k ik j hn w y − .  
Scenario 2. Shipments are treated 
  8Under Scenario 2, units discovered to be contaminated are treated and the quantity 
supplied by the ith firm is  , total tariffs paid are
2
ik ik sy = ik jy . The cost of treatment at the border 
is x per unit with total cost of treatment equal to ( (1), ) ik k ik xhn w y . The firm pays a per unit 
penalty of   under Scenario 2. The penalty for the firm in this case will be 
 with total penalties collected,  . The 
total enforcement cost for the firm will be
2 t









2 () ( ( 1 ) , ) ik k ik x th n wy + . Treatment may not be 
completely effective. After treatment, pest populations on the output discovered to be 
contaminated are  , where  is the Scenario 2, Stage 2 kill function 
bounded between 0 and 1, and 
( (1), ) (1) ( ) ik k ik hn w n zx () zx
0 z
x
∂ < ∂ .  
Stage 3: Post-border 
The firm’s output is shipped to a final market with per unit transportation cost from the 
port of  , and sold for price,  k l p . Total supply  ( ; , , , , , ) T Sp w t x j l τ  comes from two sources, 
domestic supply,  , and expected foreign importer supply. Pest detection and damage are 
random variables as are all other variables affected by damage. To simplify the analysis, we 
consider the expected value of the foreign supply function and resulting prices and quantities. 
Thus
( ) D Sp
p is the price that occurs given foreign supply is at its expected level for every  p . Expected 
total supply is: 
Scenario 1:  
11 (; ) () TD Sp Sp S F = + i , and 
Scenario 2: 
22 (; ) () TD Sp S p S F = + i , 
where  and   are the profit maximizing supply from foreign importing firms under Scenario 





  9Scenario, ,   to generate equilibrium prices and quantities, 
,  ,
1(; ) () T Sp D p = i
2(; ) () T Sp D p = i
11 * () D Sp
1*
F S
1* p , and , ,
22 * () D Sp
2*
F S






CS D p p ds =− ∫ , 






DD PS p S p ds =− ∫ ] . 
Environmental damages depend on the number of pests arriving on imported goods, N, as 
well as the level of responsive treatment, R. We assume that environmental damage   
increases with pest populations and declines with treatment (
( , ) VNR
/ 0,  / 0 VN VR ∂ ∂>∂ ∂<). We 
further assume increasing marginal damage with respect to  ,  N
22 / VN 0 ∂ ∂>  and decreasing 
efficacy of treatment,  .   
22 /0 VR ∂∂ <
 
The Firm’s Decision 
The ith firm determines through which port to ship, how much to export, and how much to treat. 
The firm is assumed to maximize expected profit taking prices as given and given the risk that 
contaminated produce may be detected. Under Scenario 1, output that is discovered to be 
contaminated is destroyed, under Scenario 2, contaminated output is treated. It is a 
discrete/continuous choice problem: 
Scenario 1:   {}
1 1 max
( )(1 ( (1), )) ( (1), ) ( , )
,
i k ik k ik k ik ik i ik ik k
ik ik
Max p j l h n w t h n w y c y e
ye
τ
⎧⎫ ⎡⎤ Π= − − − − − − ⎨⎬ ⎣⎦ ⎩⎭
Scenario 2:    {}
22 max
() ( ( 1 ) , ) ( , )
,
i ik k k ik ik i ik ik k
ik ik
Max p x t h n w j l y c y e
ye
τ
⎧⎫ ⎡⎤ Π= − + −− − − ⎨⎬ ⎣⎦ ⎩⎭
This optimization problem can be broken down to sub-problems where: 
  10Scenario 1:  {}
11 max
( )(1 ( (1), )) ( (1), ) ( , )
,
ik k ik k ik k ik ik i ik ik
ik ik
p j l hn w thn w y c y e
ye
πτ ⎡⎤ =− − − − − − ⎣⎦  
Scenario 2:  {}
22 max
() ( ( 1 ) , ) ( ,
,
ik ik k k ik ik i ik ik
ik ik
) p xth n w jl y cye
ye
πτ ⎡⎤ =− + − − − − ⎣⎦  
are solved first and then the optimal port is selected by solving  
{ }
11
ii k Max k π Π= , or  { }
22
ii k Max k π Π= . 




1 0 (1 ( (1), )) ( )(1 ( (1), )) ( (1), ) ik i
ik k k ik k ik k ik
ik ik
c p hn w j l hn w thn w yy
π τ ∂ ∂ =⇒ − = + − + + + ∂∂ , 
(2) 
1
1 (1) (1) 0( ) ( ) (1) (1)
ki k
ik k ik
ik ik ik ik ik
i
ik
nn hh i k p ty j l en e n
c
e









2 0( ) ( ( 1 ) , ) ik ik
ik k k ik
ik ik
c px t h n w j l yy
π τ ∂∂ =⇒ = + +++ + ∂∂ , and 
(4) 
2
2 (1) 0( ) (1)
ik ik ik
ik
ik ik ik ik
nc h xt y en e
π ∂∂ ⎛⎞ ∂ =⇒ + − = ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ⎝⎠ e
∂
∂ . 
Equations (1) and (2) define  and  , optimal firm output and point-of-origin treatment for all 
firms at each port under Scenario 1, and similarly, equations (3) and (4) define and  . Each 
firm then chooses to ship through the profit-maximizing port of entry. Solving equations (1) and 














( )(1 ( (1), )) ( (1), )
(1) () ) (1)








p j l h nwt h nw
cc
ye y n h pt jl ne
τ
⎡⎤ −− − −
⎢⎥

















px t h n w j l
cc
ye y n h x ty ne
τ
⎡⎤ −+ − −
⎢⎥
∂∂ ⎢⎥ −− + ∂∂ ⎣⎦ = ∂ ⎛⎞ ∂ +− ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠
. 
 
Equations (1) through (4) show that at optimal levels of output and point-of-origin treatment, the 
marginal benefits of the firm’s action will equal its cost. Equation (1) shows that under Scenario 
1, the marginal increase in revenue associated with an increase in output is tempered by the 
losses of contaminated goods that are destroyed. The marginal cost of increased output consists 
of higher production and transportation costs and higher penalties. Equation (2) shows that the 
marginal benefits of an increase in point-of-origin treatment are reduced discovery and thus 
increased revenue and decreased penalties, while the marginal costs are increased transportation 
costs from the port to market, and higher production costs. Under Scenario 2, the marginal 
benefit of increasing output is not tempered by destroyed product because contaminated output is 
treated rather than destroyed. The marginal costs of increased output are not only higher 
production costs, transportation costs, and penalties, but also treatment costs. Equations (5) and 
(6) show that if the lower marginal benefit of an additional unit of output under Scenario 1 
versus Scenario 2 is not offset by sufficiently low marginal cost, then optimal output under 
Scenario 1 is less than that under Scenario 2.  
Proposition 1: If ( ) k p jl x −− >and 
1 tt
2 =  then  . 
1* 2*
ik ik yy <
Single Port-of-Entry 
  12Regulators determine the intensity of inspections and border treatment, and set tariffs and 
penalties. Assume for now there is a single port-of-entry,  1 k = , so firms choose the amount of 
output and pre-entry treatment only. Based on comparative statics analysis of equations (1) and 
(2) for Scenario 1, and equations (3) and (4) for Scenario 2, we evaluate how firm   responds to 
changes made by regulators in inspection levels, tariffs, penalties, as well as changes in 
economic conditions, and pest populations (details are not presented here, contact authors for 







∂ = ∂∂ . 
Condition 1 means that the relationship between pest population levels on shipments at the 
border and the level of discovery does not change as inspection levels change, or alternatively 
that the slope of the discovery function with respect to inspection does not change as initial pest 





























Conditions 2 and 3 involve a key parameter - the elasticity of the marginal cost of treatment with 










i c ∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂∂
. When ε is greater than unity, marginal 
treatment cost with respect to output is greater than average treatment cost with respect to output. 
This suggests a strong positive relationship between the cost of treatment and the scale of 
production. When ε is small, marginal treatment cost with respect to output is not responsive to a 
change in the scale of output. This corresponds to a situation where high initial costs are 
associated with point-of-origin treatment. We cannot rule out either situation as infeasible a 
  13priori. These conditions relate to signs of the off-diagonal elements of the Hessian matrix in the 
comparative statics analysis. 
Several propositions concerning inspection intensity follow. 
Proposition 2a: An increase in inspection will always decrease the optimal level 





dw < ) if Condition 1 holds.  
Proposition 2b: Assume Condition 1 holds. An increase in inspection will lead to 





dw > 0 )
)
, if Condition 2 holds 
(1 ε > .   
Behind Proposition 2a is the reasoning the that an increase in inspection is equivalent to a 
decrease in the price received by firms, and firms reduce their output accordingly. The 
reasoning behind Proposition 2b is more subtle. When the response of the marginal cost 
of treatment with respect to output is elastic, the average cost of treatment declines, 
meaning that profits increase with more treatment. This leads to the intuitive result that 
an increase in inspection will encourage firms to take more care before shipment. Total 
point-of-origin treatment applied by the firm may either increase or decrease, however, 
because output declines. When the response of the marginal cost of treatment with 
respect to output is inelastic, however, we obtain an opposite result – firms’ profits will 
increase with less point-of-origin treatment. Under these conditions, total point-of-origin 
treatment applied decreases.` 





∂ ≥ ∂∂ , meaning that as Stage 2 pest 
populations increase, each unit of inspection effort becomes more effective, the results in 
the case that  1 ε >  do not change while the results in the case that  1 ε <  (there is not a 
  14strong relationship between scale of production and marginal cost of treatment) do. In the 
second case, inspection intensity may be positively or negatively related to output and 
point-of-origin treatment depending, in part, on the relative magnitudes of the slope of 













∂∂ ∂ i k
, where  (1) (0) i
i
ik ik
n g n ee





∂ is the slope of the 
point-of-origin treatment function. This means that inspection and output level could be 
positively related if marginal cost of treatment does not rise with production, the slope of 
discovery function with respect to inspection is shallow, and the point-of-origin treatment 
function is steep. 
The regulator’s choice of enforcement scenario will affect the impact of other 
policy tools. In this model, the response of firms to changes in inspection intensity will be 
different under a policy of destroying contaminated shipments versus treating these 
shipments. If Condition 1 holds, the difference between the two scenarios is clear. If 





∂ ≥ ∂∂ , the results do not change unless 
1 ε <  and thus inspection intensity may be positively or negatively related to output and 
point-of-origin treatment as just discussed. 
Proposition 2c: The response of output and point-of-origin treatment to 
changes in inspection intensity will be greater under Scenario 1(destroy) 
than Scenario 2 (treat) if 
1 () ( k
2 ) p jl t xt −−+ > + and if Condition 1 holds. 
Under Scenario 1, because output discovered to be contaminated is destroyed and is not 
part of total supply, the firm response to increases in inspection intensity is affected by 
lost revenue, avoided tariff and transportation costs and penalties levied on this output. 
  15Under Scenario 2, output discovered to be contaminated is treated and remains part of 
total supply.  
Tariffs have a clear effect on the choices made by firms. An increase in a tariff is 
essentially a reduction in price per unit of output or marginal revenue thus an increase in the per 
unit tariff unambiguously decreases both output and point-of-origin treatment. 
Proposition 3a: An increase in tariffs will decrease the optimal level of output and 
point-of-origin treatment under Scenario 1 and 2 
**
(0 , ii ye
jj
∂∂ 0 ) < < ∂∂ .  
The effect of a change in penalties on firm behavior is not as clear because a change in the level 
of the per unit penalty has a different effects on the marginal benefit of output and treatment. In 
this model, penalties are levied on each unit of output discovered to be contaminated, so an 
increase in penalties decreases the marginal revenue of output, leading to a decrease in both 
output and treatment. An increase in penalties, however, also increases the marginal benefit of 
point-of-origin treatment in the form of avoided penalties which would lead to an increase in 
treatment and output. Thus, if the effect of increased penalties on the marginal benefit of point-
of-origin treatment is great enough to overcome the effect on the loss in marginal revenue of 
output, output and point-of-origin treatment will increase.   
Proposition 3b: If Condition 2 holds (1 ) ε > , an increase in penalties will lead to 
an decrease in output (
*




2 0 ik dy
dt
> ) and may increase or decrease 
pre-entry output.  If Condition 3 holds (1 ) ε < , an increase in inspection will lead 





dw < ).   
Economic conditions determine transportation costs from the origin to the border, and 
from the border to market, as well as prices. As with inspection intensity, an increase in 
  16transportation cost to the border essentially reduces per unit revenue and as such is negatively 
related to output. The effect on point-of-origin treatment depends on whether the elasticity of the 
marginal cost of treatment with respect to output is greater or less than unity. 
Proposition 4a: An increase in transportation cost from the origin to the border 






dτ < ).  
Proposition 4b: Under Condition 2 ( 1) ε > , an increase in the cost of 
transportation from the point of origin to the border will lead to an increase in 





dτ > . Under Condition 3 ( 1) ε < , an 






dτ < ).   
In contrast, transportation cost from the port of entry to market,  , has an unambiguous negative 
relationship to output and point-of-origin treatment.  
k l
Proposition 4c: An increase in transportation cost from the port of entry to the 
border will decrease the optimal level of output and point-of-origin treatment 
under Scenario 1 and 2 
**




∂∂ 0 ) < < ∂∂ . 
Output price, p , is positively related to point-of-origin treatment and output levels given 
Condition 2 holds.  




dp > , 
*
0 ik de
dp > ) under Scenarios 1 and 2, if 
Condition 3( 1) ε < holds. 
  17At the point of origin, post-harvest, each firm’s output has an associated initial pest 
population.  
Proposition 5a: An increase in initial pest populations will decrease the optimal 






dn < ) if Condition 2 holds. 
Proposition 5b: An increase in initial pest populations may lead to an increase or 






dn ) if Condition 2 holds. If 
Condition 3 holds, an increase in initial pest populations will lead to an increase 






dn > ).   
As with inspection intensity, the relationship in Proposition 5a holds because an increase in 
initial pest populations is equivalent to a decrease in price, so firms reduce output supplied. 
Proposition 5b indicates that when the marginal cost of treatment with respect to output is greater 
than unity, the average cost of treatment declines with a drop in output, and point-of-origin 
treatment becomes more cost-effective. Thus, in response to an increase in initial pest 
populations, firms will employ more treatment. If instead the marginal cost of treatment with 
respect to output is less than unity, firms may respond to higher initial pest populations by 
increasing or reducing point-of-origin treatment, depending, in part, on the relative magnitudes 





∂ . If the kill function is effective, 





∂ is steep, then firms are likely to respond to increases in 






dn > ). 
  18The model specifies that for the  1,..., iI = importing firms that handle a specific 
agricultural product, and pest risk increases with  . This could be represented by further 
assuming that initial pest populations,  , increase with i. Thus, low-risk firms have lower 
initial pest populations, , where the  and   subscripts denote that of low- or 
high-risk firms, and the comparative statics analysis on firm response to changes in   can 
serve as an analysis of firm heterogeneity. Assume for now that   and the discovery 
function,  , do not vary with   and all other parameters are equal between firms. 
Shipments from low-risk firms through the single port of entry are larger than those from high-
risk firms,  , point-of-origin treatment levels may be higher or lower depending on the 
elasticity of marginal treatment cost with respect to output,   or 
i
(0) i n
(0) (0) LH nn < L H
(0) i n
( , ) ii ki k cye
( (1), ) ik hn w i
L yy > H
H H L ee > L ee < , and pest 
populations on shipments at the border may be lower or higher,  (1) (1) LH nn <  or  . 
Firms that are initially very high-risk may choose not to ship at all, selling their output on the 
domestic market. Medium-risk firms may reduce exports slightly while low-risk, high profit 
margin firm may not significantly change the levels of output or point-of-origin treatment.    
(1) (1) LH nn >
The pest population associated with firm  ’s output at the end of Stage 2 under Scenario 
1 is: 
i
     , 
1(2) (1 ( (1), )) (1) ii k k i k nh n w n =− i k y
i k i k y
while the total number of pests that enter the country,  , under Scenario 1 is:  N
   . 
11
11 11




Nn h n w n
== ==
== − ∑∑ ∑∑
Under Scenario 2, at the end of Stage 2, the pest population on undiscovered, untreated output 
and discovered, treated output is: 
[ ]
2 (2) (1 ( (1), )) ( (1), ) ( ) (1) ik ik k ik k ik ik nh n w h n w z x n =− + y , 
  19while the total number of pests that enter the country is: 
   .  []
2
11
(2) (1 ( (1), )) (1) ( (1), ) (1) ( )
KI
ik k ik ik k ik ik
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The effect of changes in inspection levels on pest populations under Scenario 1, 
, and under Scenario 2,  , assuming a single port, 
, are defined by:  
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These results lead to the following. 
Proposition 6a: Stage 2 pest populations unambiguously decrease with an increase 
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Proposition 6b: The relationship between inspection intensity and Stage 2 pest 
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  20The result in Proposition 6a is due to the negative relationship between output and inspection 




∂ < ∂  (higher inspection levels result in lower output which in turn means a 
reduced pest population), and positive relationship between point-of-origin treatment and 








∂ ∂∂ = > ∂∂ ∂ ). Proposition 6b 
follows from equations (7) and (8). 
 
Two Ports-of-Entry 
If we now assume there are two ports from which firms may choose, Port A and Port B, firms 
will determine optimal output and pre-entry treatment for each port and then choose the profit-
maximizing port. If it is initially optimal for firm   to ship through Port A, then it must be the 
case that 
i
iA iB π π > , or  0 iA iB π π −≥ , where  iA π  and  iB π  are the optimized profits for firm i at 
Port A and Port B. If regulator decisions or economic conditions change such that  0 iA iB π π −< , 
then firm i will switch to Port B. Note that while profits at the optimal port for firm   must be 
higher than optimal profits at all other ports, output level at the optimal port may not necessarily 
be higher depending on the cost structures at the other ports. The difference between optimized 






( ) (1 ( (1), )) (1 ( (1), )) ( (1), )
(( ( 1 ) , ) ) ( , ) ( , ) 0
iA iB k iA A iA iB B iB iA A iA
iB B iB iA iA iB iB i iA iA i iB iB
p j l hn w y hn w y thn w y
th n w y y y cy e cy e
ππ
ττ
−= − − − − − −
+− + − + >  
As increases occur in either inspection at Port A, transportation cost to Port A, or transportation 
cost from Port A to the market, profit at Port A decreases while profit at Port B is unaffected and 
the difference between optimized profits for Port A and Port B declines. If market price is port-
specific, then a decline in price at Port A would also decrease the profit differential. 
  21Proposition 7a: An increase in any port-specific cost or decrease in port-specific 
revenue will make firms more likely to switch away from the particular port. 
   A change in initial pest populations will affect optimal profit at both Port A and Port B 
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∂  is steep (as initial pest populations increase, inspections 




∂  is not, then firms are more likely to switch to 
Port B. Alternatively, if the kill (survival) function at Port A,  , is much greater than that at 
Port B,  , though this seems unlikely, firms may switch to Port B. Note that under Scenario 
2 we have:  
( ) iA ge
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Proposition 7b: Under Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, a change in initial pest 
populations,  , for firm   may cause that firm to switch ports depending on 
the relative magnitudes of 














Regulators may choose to increase inspection intensity uniformly across all ports, reducing profit 
at all ports. This change affects the profit differential under Scenario 1 as follows: 
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Note that under Scenario 2, 
1 () A p jt l −+−  and 
1 ( B) p jt l − +−  in this equation would be 
replaced with 
2 () x t + . If the slope of the discovery function with respect to inspection intensity 
for Port A is steep so that profit for Port A is reduced significantly by an increase in inspection 
while the slope for Port B is shallow, firms may switch to Port B.  
Proposition 7c: Under Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, firms may respond to a uniform 
increase in inspection intensity by switching ports depending on the relative 
magnitudes of  (( 1 ) , ) iA hn w
w
∂





As with the single port case, different types of firms will make different port choices. For 
example, high-risk firms with high initial pest populations are more likely to prefer ports with 
lower inspection intensities. Moreover, different firms have different responses to changes in 
enforcement. Thus, as inspection intensity increases at a particular port, firms that ship through 
that port are likely to separate into three groups: high-risk firms that choose not to export at all; 
others that will switch to a lower enforcement port, perhaps located farther from the source of the 
commodity or market; and low-risk firms that though they ship lower quantities, continue to ship 
through the now more rigorous port with lower transportation costs. The specifics of these 
separating equilibria are crucial to evaluate in order to fully understand the role and implications 
of firm heterogeneity for enforcement policy in a multiple-port setting.  
Port-specific attributes that can affect the effectiveness of inspection or make discovery 
more difficult (such as congestion or port size), or alternatively, importers that take illicit action 
to deter successful inspection, may play a significant role in determining pest risk. The model 
  23can be expanded to include the difficulty of discovery at the kth location as  k ψ , defining a type 
of port heterogeneity. Essentially, this means that the slope of the discovery function with respect 




∂ ∂ ≠ ∂ ∂ . A port with high 
k ψ may have a higher level of  , but the discovery rate may be less than at other ports, so 
higher risk firms may still choose this port. Factors affecting difficulty of discovery are also 
crucial to specify and evaluate. 
k w
 
Social Planner’s Decision 
We define domestic social welfare as the sum of expected domestic consumer surplus and 
producer surplus minus environmental damages, inspection costs, and response costs: 
. D sw ExpCS PS Envir Damages Inspection Response =+ − − − . 
Environmental damages and response costs are random variables under both scenarios. The 
social planner chooses penalties, inspection levels, and post-border response for each 
enforcement scenario: 
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11 * 1 *1 * (,,; ) ik ik sw sw y e p = i
1* p defines  and  . Similarly, 
under Scenario 2,  . Expected total supply is  . We assume well-
behaved functions. The social planner then chooses the optimal enforcement scenario: 




22 * 2 *2 * (,,; ik ik sw sw y e p = i
* ()
T Sp




SW MAX sw sw = . 
The following conditions define optimal levels of inspection, penalties and response under both 
Scenarios ( under Scenario 1 and  under Scenario 2): 
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Equation (15) shows that at the optimal level of inspection for a particular port, the 
marginal costs of inspection will equal its benefits. The marginal costs of inspection are the 
losses in consumer surplus from reduced supply and higher prices, plus additional per unit 
inspection costs, while the marginal benefits of inspection are the gains to domestic producer 
surplus from a decrease in import supply and an associated increase in price, reduced damages 
from reduced pest populations, and reduced inspection costs due to lower output levels. Equation 
(16) shows that the marginal costs of increasing penalties are the losses in consumer surplus 
only, and the marginal benefits are an increase in domestic producer surplus and reduced 
  25damages. Equation (17) shows that an additional dollar spent on response to pest damages should 
equal its marginal benefit. 
  
Discussion 
Several policy-relevant implications can be drawn from the present analysis. As noted above, 
increased enforcement (in the form of higher inspection intensity) will not necessarily result in 
reduced pest risk. Importers may respond to increased inspection intensity by lowering shipment 
amounts and increasing point-of-origin treatment (i.e., due care), but under certain situations they 
may actually respond by decreasing care in order to lower the cost of shipment. Similarly, these 
same conditions also dictate whether or not the level of care will increase or decrease with the 
level of the pest population at the point of shipment. This is an important point for inspectors 
who may seek to prioritize inspections on the basis of the level of pests in the exporting country. 
Firms consider the tradeoffs associated with the costs and benefits associated with 
location – i.e., inspection intensity versus transportation costs to port-of-entry and final market. 
Different types of firms will weigh these tradeoffs differently. The present analysis implies that 
high-risk firms are likely to select ports that are perceived to be low-enforcement ports, perhaps 
forfeiting distance, while low-risk firms are likely to value transportation cost savings versus 
avoiding enforcement. High-risk firms may choose low-enforcement ports rather than costly 
point-of-origin treatment.  
  Another key element of this analysis is that regulators can choose between destroying and 
treating infested shipments. The preferred option will depend on the cost of responsive treatment, 
the magnitude of damages that may result from an invasive species becoming established, and 
the impact on domestic consumers from reduced imports of destroyed goods. Destroying 
  26infected shipments is likely to be optimal when response costs and/or potential damages are high, 
and when the impact on domestic consumers is low. In the reverse situation, treatment at the 
ports may be preferred.  As described above, the relative impacts of tariffs and penalties on 
shipper behavior are also likely to differ under destruction versus treatment regimes. 
The model presented above is simplified in many respects. Notably, it does not 
incorporate heterogeneous levels of risk aversion on the part of firms/importers/shippers or the 
dynamics that may arise when multiple importing countries have different inspection regimes. 
The model also does not incorporate the potential ability of inspectors to target known bad actors 
by incorporating learning over time. This latter omission is not actually as salient as it may first 
appear, however, as many shippers actually do take steps to avoid bad reputations by changing 
their stated identities, and it is very difficult for port officials to track these bad actors over time. 
Other interesting issues arise when more consideration is given to the purchasing 
arrangements for imported goods. Many shippers operate under contract to buyers in the 
importing country. These buyers may impose penalties if produce is not delivered on time.  In 
some cases, pricing may be determined by monopsonistic or oligopsonistic behavior on the part 
of these buyers. Large shippers may choose to invest in their own treatment equipment, which 
gives them a new source of market power over fringe firms. To consider these issues more fully, 
it would be appropriate to model inspection as a nested process: first in the field, then by 
shippers, then by government, and finally by commercial buyers. Although some of these 
inspection levels would be more focused on product quality than on the presence of invasives, 
such considerations would give rise to the possibility of both synergies and tradeoffs between 
product quality and invasive species management. 
It is also worth acknowledging that inspections can be very costly, and liability schemes 
can provide alternative enforcement mechanisms. Millock, Xabadia and Zilberman (2006) 
  27suggest mechanisms to induce payment for monitoring by the regulated community. Importers 
can either pay for high quality inspection, or be subjected to a less rigorous inspection but pay 
higher fixed fees based on estimated damage. While their framework is general and addresses 
generic externality problems under uncertainty, it provides a foundation for combining 
monitoring schemes and pricing strategies for invasive species control. 
This article is part of a larger project integrating import and economic data with spatial 
models of invasive species damages. This model provides the foundation for an agent-based 
model and simulation analysis which allows us to evaluate specific inspection and enforcement 
schemes given heterogeneous agents and to examine the potential role of collective liability 
schemes. Issues to address in this analysis are how to model pest populations process, whether 
firms know about contamination or not, and how important are different assumptions concerning 
risk.    
Finally, this analysis leads to further policy questions:  How should government decision 
makers allocate inspection effort and structure penalties across different types of ports, given 
firm response to enforcement?  What are the options for firm-specific enforcement?  How 
quickly can regulators assimilate and utilize new information?  How do decisions by agricultural 
buyers drive the behavior of importing firms?  What are the effects of nested inspections (at 
country of origin, Federal border inspections, State inspections)?  These questions have 
implications not only for invasive species management, but also for food safety and bioterrorism 
concerns. 
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  31Figure 1.  
Model of Pest Population and Movement, Importing Firm Decisions, Border 
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